It's the difference between an author and a book critic.

She's some kind of sick joke, right? What's her claim to fame? Being right as often as "William the Bloody" Kristol and Charles Kraphammer?

It's not right to simply say withdraw and we're going to ignore the consequences.

Kevin is absolutely right. Anne Applebaum criticizes everybody who offers some way out of this mess, but does not provide a way out herself. The simple fact is that no matter what we do thousands upon thousands of Iraqi will die.

The question is how we limit the damage to American soldiers and American interests? The only way do that is to withdraw from the country itself. Contain the violence and focus on the Al-Quaeda central leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Exactly what the Democrats are arguing for.

It's not right to simply say escalate and we're going to ignore the deaths of tens of thousands for vanity of one man.

Actually, the worst part was when she said that those who want to remove all US troops in Iraq are, "clothed in the greatest degree of hypocrisy." She doesn't acknowledge that there are several differences between the conflict in Darfur and in Iraq (almost universal support for action in Darfur, not going for regime change, etc.). She doesn't seem to acknowledge that it is the current administrations failures for the whole thing. And she seems to suggest that the responsibility of what happens in Iraq is the next administrations' fault, and not the one currently in power.

Well, we have to do something, don't we?

Then why don't we wait till September to hear from General David Petraeus and hear his assessment before deciding on how to move forward? This war should be run by the generals on the ground, not by politicians in Congress grandstanding for the public.

Darfur can be helped by instituting a no-fly zone against the Sudanese military.

Not knowing what exactly to do about leaving Iraq should not stop us from impeaching Cheney.

54% of Americans poled approve of impeachment for Cheney.

See the American Research Group poll data.

Actually the generals are not in charge of the question of whether or not war should be waged or not. That is a question exclusively for Congress. It would be a mistake to simply turn over to the military the issue of whether or not to wage war.

The idea that we're buffering anything by our presence there is egotistical nonsense.
There's absolutely no inducation that we are slowing down the civil war.
The argument is a purely rhetorical game: deliberately ignoring the current level of violence, they're waiting for the withdrawal, whereupon they can bleat, "See? Violence SKYROCKETED once we left!"

Anne Applebaum is a pretty smart pundit and she makes you folks look petty and mean for dismissing her.

At a time like this when America is stymied with one bad approach after another, America can use the help of Anne Applebaum to help us move forward.

Anne Applebaum, born 1964, you are perfect material for helping America, In The Green Zone.

Al: "This war should be run by the generals on the ground, not by politicians..."

Al, we tried this little thing called a constitutional democracy. But it made people like you uncomfortable. So we handed the whole thing over to a criminal gang.

So how's basic training going, anyway?

I agree that this is a struggle that is difficult for many to understand. It is not clear cut, but it is sensible when you think of it without political baggage.

1. We want for the Iraqis to have their own country--a stable prosperous country free and secure.

2. The above can be achieved primarily through the efforts of the Iraqi people themselves, but not necessarily exclusively. This is a new born country.

3. Iraq is under assault by foreign forces to include a significant internationalist terrorist organization--the same organization that makes war against us.

4. We are not at war in Iraq. We are involved in security, reconstruction, and stability operations.

5. The native Iraqi forces are not yet strong enough to defend themselves against foreign terrorists and also preventing a general sectarian conflagration of revenge killings.

6. We can.

Gee, thanks for the swell talking points, pasha. We didn't realize that the Young Republicans now have branches in the sixth grade. Will you be joining the Air Cadets really, really soon?

That is it??

No good response? No intelligent argument for or against?

Not very impressive.

Let me add this:

Bush Sr. should go to Iraq and beg Iraqi people for forgiveness for Anfal

I will also add:

Our best allies in the fight against terrorism are those in Iraq that suffer most

See, it is clear now? We make no excuses for our decision. Either we help or we don't.

I will help. You can help also, but that is your decision. You can also wait. This is free country.

Now I sleep.

Sometimes there are no right answers. Sometimes there are no solutions to a problem. We can blame Bush and company for leading us into this mess, but it's reasonable to accept some blame for being so easily manipulated along the way.
Should we defend ourselves from violent attacks? Certainly. Beyond that, we must clearly see what is possible and what is not. Humans, as a whole, are not particularly inteligent or emotionally stable. We all suffer from tunnel vision, some suffering more than others. Perhaps we should accept our limitations before we leap to the conclusion: *we must do something.* No, actually we don't need to act if we don't know what to do. Wait, think, plan, cooperate, evaluate and reevaluate.
Perhaps we can thank Bush for reminding us of consequences of mindless action. Let's try to benefit from the lesson. Surely we can do better.

Who is Anne Applebaum, and why is she whoring around in the Post like some cheap and trashy pseudo-intellectual slut?

Further, why has almost every journalist in D.C., save for the legendary Helen Thomas, taken to aiding and abetting an administration that should be collectively prosecuted under federal RICO statutes?

"Something not worth doing is not worth doing well."

We need to GET OUT. Like a bad relationship, we can't hang around because we think we'll get yelled at if we say we're moving out. We're being yelled at right now. And we can't insist on winning the last argument with the spouse, because then we're just going to prolong the agony. GET OUT.

Iraq and Darfur are not equivalent cases for the reasons cited. In one case short term intervention might work, in other case everyone knew it wasn't going to work - everyone who had ever read a history of warfare book, that is.

pasha,

Your bullet points have been treated with the seriousness they deserve. Each point is based upon false assumptions and a kind of poorly thought out rhetoric that does smack of adolescent Republicanism. Nonetheless, I will humor you:

I agree that this is a struggle that is difficult for many to understand. It is not clear cut, but it is sensible when you think of it without political baggage.

For most of us, this is not at all difficult to understand. There was no good reason to enter this conflict and there remains no good reason to stay. It is only "political baggage" that keeps us there.

1. We want for the Iraqis to have their own country--a stable prosperous country free and secure.

We also want peace on Earth and for every little boy and girl to have their own pony. We want, in other words, lots of things, but it is obvious to most people over the age of 12 that you can't always get what you want.

2. The above can be achieved primarily through the efforts of the Iraqi people themselves, but not necessarily exclusively. This is a new born country.

Setting aside for the moment that this laughably simplistic assertion papers over highly contentious differences between what various groups of Iraqis would like to achieve, the fact is that there is no legitimate role for the American military in foreign country's political process. That is the point of this argument. Whether our fighting force ought to involve itself in a foreign political conflict - a position for which all fighting forces are very poorly suited.

3. Iraq is under assault by foreign forces to include a significant internationalist terrorist organization--the same organization that makes war against us.

There is, of course, very little evidence of this. It has been demonstrated time and again that the vast percentage of fighters involved in the insurgency are not foreign born. To the extent that there are, the fighters tend to be from places like Saudi Arabia. Moreover, it is also pretty clear that foreign fighters are there largely because we are. They are there to mess with us. Iraq has very little value to them otherwise.

4. We are not at war in Iraq. We are involved in security, reconstruction, and stability operations.

You can call it anything you like if it somehow makes you feel better not to use the word war. It is immaterial to the larger argument about whether we should stay in a place and continue to kill and be killed or leave that place.

5. The native Iraqi forces are not yet strong enough to defend themselves against foreign terrorists and also preventing a general sectarian conflagration of revenge killings.

As I have already said, this foreign terrorist claim is basically bullshit. Its the sort of thing that warmongers trot out because they have very little else in the way of justification for their war. More importantly, the sectarian conflagration is already going on. It is quite clear that we can also do very little to prevent it and that the last thing we really want to do is put ourselves in the center of a growing civil war. Of course, you are somehow arguing that this is precisely what we want to do: involve ourselves in another country's civil war.

6. We can.

No, we can't or at least that there is no evidence that we can. The civil war aspect of this has been getting worse and worse every month of our occupation. When you have 50, 60, 70 sectarian beheadings showing up on a regular basis, I would say you have a civil war. But whatever you want to call it, we certainly haven't demonstrated that we can put any sort of a stop to it.

Who the hell does Anne Applebaum think she is, Goldilocks, that we've just *just* the *right* number of troops there right now?

She doesn't want more troops. She doesn't want fewer. She doesn't want to change anything.

Perfect. What is she, George W. Bush in drag?

Good points, brent, but pasha doesn't give a shit what you say because he/she/it won't read the comment. See commenting at 4am allows pasha to tell his confreres that the libs have nothing but ad hominem attacks in response to "real" arguments for staying in Iraq.
You might also point out that the Iraqi military has nothing but infantry divisions with which to defend itself from its neighbors. No air force, no navy, no artillery, one armored division with tanks donated by Hungary, trucks (other than fine Toyota pick-ups) from old Soviet factories (Naz and Gaz). In short, nothing that could be used by those yet to be trained soldiers that could be turned against the US.
The Iraqis arguably need us to stay because we won't allow the government the means to defend themselves from the neighbors.
The right thing is to leave. We're not there to do the right thing. We're there because as Lord Templeton said: There are no permanent friends, there are no permanent enemies, there are only permanent interests.. Never forget that.

AA is married to a Pole politician. I think it's underestimated how many people saw this war as the fourth wave of democracy, after the democratization of eastern Europe. They were the morally serious looking for something to do with their seriousness.

I will take a stab at explaining things to you foolish liberals.

This is what "pasha" had to say:

I agree that this is a struggle that is difficult for many to understand. It is not clear cut, but it is sensible when you think of it without political baggage.

1. We want for the Iraqis to have their own country--a stable prosperous country free and secure.

So long as they are giving us a good rate on the oil they sell, I do not care what they do with their country. I am preparing an investment portfolio that I have strategized out over the next five years--I am going to go heavily into oil futures. If the Iraqis screw this up for me, I say take away their government and let them stew in their own soup for a bit.

2. The above can be achieved primarily through the efforts of the Iraqi people themselves, but not necessarily exclusively. This is a new born country.

There is nothing "new born" about a society where something that happened 850 years ago is de facto the central organizing principle of the entire country. There is nothing new under the sun in the Middle East. There is just history you forgot that keeps repeating itself over and over again.

3. Iraq is under assault by foreign forces to include a significant internationalist terrorist organization--the same organization that makes war against us.

Excuse me, but even I don't buy this notion that there is "al Qaeda" in Iraq. It is quite obviously a civil war with outside agitators thrown in to take advantage of a little chaos. And I'm a Republican, sir.

4. We are not at war in Iraq. We are involved in security, reconstruction, and stability operations.

With a lot of shooting and killing between competing forces going on? Yes, it most certainly is a war.

5. The native Iraqi forces are not yet strong enough to defend themselves against foreign terrorists and also preventing a general sectarian conflagration of revenge killings.

I see there are still but a few battalions that can operate effectively as their own entity. A pity. Many, like myself, figured there would be 50 to 60 of these battalions, rigorously destroying any opposition in this "non-war" of which you attempt to speak. If this is "not" a war then why the desperate need to stand up battalions that can fight on their own? No, the Iraq war is beginning to be bad for business, and that's just the right time to stop the fighting.

6. We can.

The "we" of which you speak is not the royal "we." You are not one of us. We are the ones trying to give an ungrateful people enough Democracy to live under. They don't want what we are giving them. Like an adult dealing with a spoiled child, it is time for "we" to spank them and walk away from them.

Bush is (intellectually) the equivalent of a 3-year old who obtained a big piece of shit to play with. The american people were told it was really play-dough and not really crap. They believed it.

Bush has now played with the shit for a quite awhile and the mess is getting bigger and bigger. [americans] Wow, it really stinks... hey, maybe it's not play-dough.

Choices:

1) Let him continue to play with the shit.
2) Give him even more shit to play with.
3) Get the shit out.

Another neocon from the Wapo stable of neocon nudniks.

Expert Applebaum played a role when she wrote that the inspections wouldn't work because she was just absolutely certain that WMD existed and that France and Germany would be "disqualified as serious members of the international community" when the weapons were really really found.

When she and the other neocons talk about responsibility for the disaster they created and the greater disaster to come, they ought to look first into the mirror.

Where the hell was Applebaum's and the other neocons great concern for the Iraqi people and the death and mayhem when they pushed this bloody, immoral war.

Yes, another intelligent morning over at TPMCafe - And the best part, it is a Free from Norman Protected Zone.

Well, there are no serious solutions for Iraq.

Bush broke it.

Now, it's just a matter of how the US can make the best of a bad situation and what policy will do the least further damage to America's reputation, honor, dignity, and national security.

One thing we do know: Bush is incapable of providing policies that will do the least further damage.

Maybe the Dems don't have any better solution, but, as conservatives are always whining about Bush, we should at least give them the chance, rather than sticking with a known loser who is incapable of even seeing his failings, blaming every failure on people outside his administration, including blaming military leaders who argued against his policies, but carried them out anyway (or were fired) when he rejected their advice.

Fixing Iraq is like asking a physician to fix a person whose leg was wrongly amputated by another physician, after that other physician had the removed leg incinerated.

"Apparently, they are all unserious"

Uh, no, I think she was saying there was too much certainty professed. Like, the people who just KNOW that the surge must fail (without fail!) after only one month of the full number of troops deployed. From where do they get this clairvoyance?

That sort of thing is less helpful than some dumbass plan.

This from "anonymous" just kills me. It's apparently a widely-held delusion here: "Maybe the Dems don't have any better solution, but, as conservatives are always whining about Bush, we should at least give them the chance..."

Huh? What Dems? Who are these Democrats who are in the administration right now, able to provide leadership, set strategy, etc?

Seriously, how can we possibly "give them the chance" before January 2009??? When has congress ever led the military in war? This isn't even possible. How do you get to such a loony idea?

The obvious solution would have been to stay out in the first place.

But then Bush and Cheney, with the help of Powell and the news media, put an end to that option, didn't they?

Someone please add her to the master list of people who are not worth reading.

Like, the people who just KNOW that the surge must fail (without fail!) after only one month of the full number of troops deployed. From where do they get this clairvoyance?

From looking at the Bush regime's unbroken record of past failure. If you've fucked up a hundred times, how confident should I be when you say that the hundred and first time will really, for sure work this time, especially when you're not really doing anything different than the hundred times before?

There's no reason that Bush's simple plan for Lebanon wouldn't work in Iraq: Just get them to stop doing this shit and it's over.

"From where do they get this clairvoyance?"

Much of it began following the utterance by Saint Donald the Rumdumb about the "last throes" - Add to that the many, many corners about to be turned.

aimon, you and your ilk are nothing more than the besotted young Dandies in the parlor room of Twelve Oaks. I would add for you to enjoy the quicksand, but, only our finest will be forced into it, not, you and your spineless cowardly ilk.

Let the Sunnis Crack Heads
--cognitorex--
Iraq was ruled by brutality and an iron hand before we arrived.
Iraq will be ruled by brutality and an iron hand after we leave.
There is no logical formulation or acceptable political arrangement that would allow for the U.S. and the future ruling force, emphasize ‘force’, to combine in the required brutality to bring Iraq under control.
If the Shiites can’t dominate Iraq on their own, then let the Sunnis crack heads and reestablish their police state.
Technically, geopolitically, we would be better off.

.... We are the ones trying to give an ungrateful people enough Democracy to live under..... Norman Rogers at 9:31 AM

It seems like everyone has a plan except Bush who wants to kick the can down the road to the next administration and hope that, if it's a Republican, they will continue the occupation and make sure some Western power is present to keep an army near the oil wells.

If the Shiites can’t dominate Iraq on their own, then let the Sunnis crack heads and reestablish their police state.
Technically, geopolitically, we would be better off.
Posted by: Craig Johnson on July 17, 2007 at 11:10 AM
--------
Actually, I think we are shifting our strategy to do just that. We are arming the Sunni tribes in Anbar province purportedly to "do away" with AQ. But, I think those Sunni tribes out West are grinning for another reason. We are going to threaten the Shia with this in a last ditch attempt to get them to pass the oil law, etc., and we could easily "threaten" the Kurds with us looking the other way to a Turkish incursion of their territory, etc. If we get the oil law, then we back off the pressure. IF we don't get it, we sit back and allow the Sunni to attack the Shia with our weapons. If Iran steps in to help the Shia government, then we've got the excuse to hammer Iran. If the Shia government tells us ("disinvites" us) to leave, then they are left unprotected. I think the Saudis are behind the idea, BTW. I think that was the topic of conversation with Cheney a few months back before the Anbar thing suddenly started becoming "pacified".

"Like, the people who just KNOW that the surge must fail (without fail!) after only one month of the full number of troops deployed. From where do they get this clairvoyance?"

From watching "the surge" play out over the past six months. What, you really think those last few thousand troops really make a difference? "Okay, 5/6 of the troops didn't cut it, but now that we have everyone, this will finally work!"

A very memorable description this week in the Guardian of the 3,500 UK troops guarding Basra Airport, and not much else, in Iraq right now

'Rorke's Drift: with air support'

The other dimension of strategy besides your external environment is your internal one: what are the resources and capabilities of your organisation?

The equilibrium US force level in Iraq is probably c. 60,000 for any period of more than 2 years. Troops cannot continue:

- to serve more than 6 months in the combat zone (Marines don't) - incidence of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder soars (see General Odum's article on this)

- to serve 15 month tours in theatre

- to be rotated 1 year Iraq, 1 year stateside, 1 year Afghanistan

- to sustain the levels of reenlistment amongst experienced officers and NCOs that are taking place

The US has to move to a less aggressive posture in Iraq. That is dictated by the capabilities of the US military, not by the political or military situation on the ground.

So all of this is pointless macho posturing. The question is whether the US can still do any good with a 60-70k force, or whether it would just be a magnet for attacks?

We know where the US is going on this, the important thing is to make plans:

- to ensure the withdrawal or destruction of as much vital equipment as possible (night vision gear, commo gear, IFVs, MBTs etc.). The withdrawal will be a difficult one (under fire, surrounded by the enemy) even to larger peripheral bases

- where are US troops in theatre going to be based? What will be the rules of engagement eg attacking Al Quaida operatives in Iraq post Occupation?

- what is the ongoing strategy for Afghanistan in light of the deterioration of conditions there? What about the Al Quaida safe areas inside Pakistan?

Every hour, every day that the US officials and military leaders delay coming to terms with the fundamental limits of American power in this situation increases the risk of a Saigon-1975 style debacle, but with much more real strategic consequences for the US.

By the way, Simon, it's disingenuous to claim that "the surge" was just about the increase in troops. It was also supposed to signal a change in tactics, new strategies for dealing with insurgencies, new rules of engagement, and the like. Moreover, "the surge," in and of itself, was never intended to be the final salvation in Iraq. Rather, it was intended to buy time for the other maneuvering, mostly political, that needs to take place. So what have we seen in the past six months?

- The change in tactics and the new rules of engagement don't seem to have done a damn thing.

- The game of "whack-a-mole" continues, with decreases in violence in some areas offset by increases in violence in other areas, something that "the surge" was specifically designed to prevent.

- The increased "neighborhood policing" that sounded so good on paper has proved to be problematic in execution, since in many cases, more men are needed to guard these neighborhood stations, which has resulted in an actual reduction in the number of hours spent making their presence known in the streets of the neighborhood.

- The political maneuvering simply has not happened. The interim report by the Bush administration was quite clear on this, even though they gave "satisfactory" marks for benchmarks that were clearly unsatisfactory (i.e., one benchmark was judged satisfactory solely on the basis that a committee had been formed -- never mind that the committee hadn't done a damn thing).

- Even though the political maneuvering has not, in fact, happened, the Iraqi Parliament is taking August off, which means it's a virtual certainty that no progress will be made before September's report.

- The broad political divisions and paralysis remain, with significant groups of the Parliament boycotting the proceedings or openly scoffing at the leadership.

- The Green Zone, supposedly the safest place in Iraq, is now so dangerous that a recent Congressional delegation was not permitted to leave the Green Zone, was not permitted to remain even a single night, was not permitted to meet with a single Iraqi, and had to wear full body armor, including Kevlar helmets, at all times.

- Add in the fact that Petraeus' own manual on this indicates that he needs far more troops than he has available (triple or quadruple the number, if I recall correctly), and that Petraeus has privately admitted that there was only a 25% chance of success.

Now, personally, given the above data, I'd say a little pessimistic "clairvoyance" is appropriate. You are free to disagree, of course, but I think I'll need something more than, "It's only been one month of the full number of troops deployed," before I'll take you seriously.

Ah, yes, the Champion against government corruption, the indefatigable Anne Applebaum. Pity none exists around her in D.C. - The poor lady must travel to the Soviets of old, or Putin today, or even that cess pool which was Little Rock of yore.

And her Polish husband of AEI fame would never influence her - Just a coincindence on why she has been so silent on anti-semitism in Poland.

If more troops are a bad idea, and fewer troops are a bad idea, what is it that makes the exact number we happen to have in theater at the moment so brilliant?

Why is it that the Bush apologists seem to all exercise the same level of debating skills that one might have expected during a late-night bull session (among the more sober members of the class) during George's college years?

Simon: How do you get to such a loony idea?

From the Constitution, of course.

You should read it sometime.

It would be very enlightening for you.

Or maybe not.

Some people are just incapable of absorbing information and facts.

E.g., President Shrub.

On the other hand, there's this, from Andrew Sullivan today, in response to David Brtooks' NYT piece on Bush's messianic fervor. Has there been a better single paragraph on the so-called philosophy behind this debacle?

"The notion that free will or even human freedom is destined to be humanity's future, and that this destiny can be achieved by a Supreme Leader, is a function not of conservatism in any sense, but of a messianic, eschatological ideology. It's the most naive form of Whiggery on half-baked evangelical steroids. It is all the more disturbing to be allied with what can only be called Bush's attachment to the Fuhrerprinzip - the fascistic notion that all human affairs can be commanded and determined by a Great Decider. Our dumb luck, alas, is that our supreme leader is a trust-fund kid with a chip on his shoulder and zero understanding of history or war."

Applebaum was just one of the WashPost's stable of writers that supported the war against Iraq. Why would anyone be surprised at what this duplicitous, lying neo-con says now?

As with the NYT, most of these writers are presumptively "liberal" (or centrist) on domestic issues, but hawks when it comes to Muslims.

pasha's probably a professional blog warrior.

This is the beauty of the "fuck it up at every turn" approach the administration has taken in executing this war. It worked in 2004. It's working now to allow W to punt this thing to the next president. The strategy is to make it so there are NO good options, period. Anyone who suggests anything can be shot down. Brilliant!

And of course the current approach 1) needs more time 2) would have worked if it weren't for the stab-in-the-back left and/or 3) is all the fault of the people whose country we invaded.

...or is the fault of the American people, who just didn't have the stomach to live up to the Leader's bold-yet-demanding vision.

Onward to Valhalla (or the bunker), troops!

There is some disagreement on facts. Fortunately, the NIE is published today:

Given this estimate, what is criticism of pasha points?

Key Judgments
Iraqi society’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and all sides’ ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during the term of this Estimate, the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006. If strengthened Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), more loyal to the government and supported by Coalition forces, are able to reduce levels of violence and establish more effective security for Iraq’s population, Iraqi leaders could have an opportunity to begin the process of political compromise necessary for longer term stability, political progress, and economic recovery.
• Nevertheless, even if violence is diminished, given the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation in the time frame of this Estimate.
The challenges confronting Iraqis are daunting, and multiple factors are driving the current trajectory of the country’s security and political evolution.
• Decades of subordination to Sunni political, social, and economic domination have made the Shia deeply insecure about their hold on power. This insecurity leads the Shia to mistrust US efforts to reconcile Iraqi sects and reinforces their unwillingness to engage with the Sunnis on a variety of issues, including adjusting the structure of Iraq’s federal system, reining in Shia militias, and easing de-Bathification.
• Many Sunni Arabs remain unwilling to accept their minority status, believe the central government is illegitimate and incompetent, and are convinced that Shia dominance will increase Iranian influence over Iraq, in ways that erode the state’s Arab character and increase Sunni repression.
• The absence of unifying leaders among the Arab Sunni or Shia with the capacity to speak for or exert control over their confessional groups limits prospects for reconciliation. The Kurds remain willing to participate in Iraqi state building but reluctant to surrender any of the gains in autonomy they have achieved.
• The Kurds are moving systematically to increase their control of Kirkuk to guarantee annexation of all or most of the city and province into the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) after the constitutionally mandated referendum scheduled to occur no later than 31 December 2007. Arab groups in Kirkuk continue to resist violently what they see as Kurdish encroachment.
• Despite real improvements, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)—particularly the Iraqi police—will be hard pressed in the next 12-18 months to execute significantly increased security responsibilities, and particularly to operate independently against Shia militias with success. Sectarian divisions erode the dependability of many units, many are hampered by personnel and equipment shortfalls, and a number of Iraqi units have refused to serve outside of the areas where they were recruited.
• Extremists—most notably the Sunni jihadist group al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) and Shia oppositionist Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)—continue to act as very effective accelerators for what has become a self-sustaining inter-sectarian struggle between Shia and Sunnis.
• Significant population displacement, both within Iraq and the movement of Iraqis into neighboring countries, indicates the hardening of ethno-sectarian divisions, diminishes Iraq’s professional and entrepreneurial classes, and strains the capacities of the countries to which they have relocated. The UN estimates over a million Iraqis are now in Syria and Jordan.
The Intelligence Community judges that the term “civil war� does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shia-on-Shia violence, al-Qa’ida and Sunni insurgent attacks on Coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence. Nonetheless, the term “civil war� accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population displacements.
Coalition capabilities, including force levels, resources, and operations, remain an essential stabilizing element in Iraq. If Coalition forces were withdrawn rapidly during the term of this Estimate, we judge that this almost certainly would lead to a significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict in Iraq, intensify Sunni resistance to the Iraqi Government, and have adverse consequences for national reconciliation.
• If such a rapid withdrawal were to take place, we judge that the ISF would be unlikely to survive as a non-sectarian national institution; neighboring countries—invited by Iraqi factions or unilaterally—might intervene openly in the conflict; massive civilian casualties and forced population displacement would be probable; AQI would attempt to use parts of the country—particularly al-Anbar province—to plan increased attacks in and outside of Iraq; and spiraling violence and political disarray in Iraq, along with Kurdish moves to control Kirkuk and strengthen autonomy, could prompt Turkey to launch a military incursion.
A number of identifiable developments could help to reverse the negative trends driving Iraq’s current trajectory. They include:
• Broader Sunni acceptance of the current political structure and federalism to begin to reduce one of the major sources of Iraq’s instability.
• Significant concessions by Shia and Kurds to create space for Sunni acceptance of federalism.
• A bottom-up approach—deputizing, resourcing, and working more directly with neighborhood watch groups and establishing grievance committees—to help mend frayed relationships between tribal and religious groups, which have been mobilized into communal warfare over the past three years.
A key enabler for all of these steps would be stronger Iraqi leadership, which could enhance the positive impact of all the above developments.
Iraq’s neighbors influence, and are influenced by, events within Iraq, but the involvement of these outside actors is not likely to be a major driver of violence or the prospects for stability because of the self-sustaining character of Iraq’s internal sectarian dynamics. Nonetheless, Iranian lethal support for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants clearly intensifies the conflict in Iraq. Syria continues to provide safehaven for expatriate Iraqi Bathists and to take less than adequate measures to stop the flow of foreign jihadists into Iraq.
• For key Sunni regimes, intense communal warfare, Shia gains in Iraq, and Iran’s assertive role have heightened fears of regional instability and unrest and contributed to a growing polarization between Iran and Syria on the one hand and other Middle East governments on the other. But traditional regional rivalries, deepening ethnic and sectarian violence in Iraq over the past year, persistent anti-Americanism in the region, anti-Shia prejudice among Arab states, and fears of being perceived by their publics as abandoning their Sunni co-religionists in Iraq have constrained Arab states’ willingness to engage politically and economically with the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad and led them to consider unilateral support to Sunni groups.
• Turkey does not want Iraq to disintegrate and is determined to eliminate the safehaven in northern Iraq of the Kurdistan People’s Congress (KGK, formerly PKK)—a Turkish Kurdish terrorist group.
A number of identifiable internal security and political triggering events, including sustained mass sectarian killings, assassination of major religious and political leaders, and a complete Sunni defection from the government have the potential to convulse severely Iraq’s security environment. Should these events take place, they could spark an abrupt increase in communal and insurgent violence and shift Iraq’s trajectory from gradual decline to rapid deterioration with grave humanitarian, political, and security consequences. Three prospective security paths might then emerge:
• Chaos Leading to Partition. With a rapid deterioration in the capacity of Iraq’s central government to function, security services and other aspects of sovereignty would collapse. Resulting widespread fighting could produce de facto partition,
dividing Iraq into three mutually antagonistic parts. Collapse of this magnitude would generate fierce violence for at least several years, ranging well beyond the time frame of this Estimate, before settling into a partially stable end-state.
• Emergence of a Shia Strongman. Instead of a disintegrating central government producing partition, a security implosion could lead Iraq’s potentially most powerful group, the Shia, to assert its latent strength.
• Anarchic Fragmentation of Power. The emergence of a checkered pattern of local control would present the greatest potential for instability, mixing extreme ethno-sectarian violence with debilitating intra-group clashes.

pasha is proud that pasha very simple analysis is suported by NIE.

Pasha hope to improve analysis even better than all US intelligence

What you think?

Iraq is Abu-Quagmire, the Father of all Quagmires, the Sandpit, the neoncon Roach Motel--neocons check in and they can't get out again.

Luther, right on dude. Interestingly I liked your misspelling of neocon as "neoncon". It makes it SO much more like "Potterville" in "It's a Wonderful Life". Also, it makes me wonder if fluorescent lights are inferior as a roach traffic deterrent as incandescent lights.

"Iraq is Abu-Quagmire, the Father of all Quagmires, the Sandpit, the neoncon Roach Motel--neocons check in and they can't get out again."
_______________________

Al Qaeda couldn't have written it better - well, except for the typo.

Here's a report from another unwitting dupe deployed in Iraq. He's undoubtedly less sophisticated than the posters here, but his simple earnestness is just the kind of thinking we need to squash in order to ensure defeat. Just think of him as a roach, if that helps:

As requested, progress report from Ramadi:

Security here in Ramadi continues to improve as the Iraqi police and army forces work daily to keep the population safe. When we arrived in February, we were averaging 30 � 35 attacks per day in our area of responsibility. Now our average is one attack per day or less. We had an entire week with no attacks in our area and have a total of over 65 days with no attacks. I attribute this success to our close relationship with the Iraqi security forces and the support those forces receive from the civilian population. The Iraqi police and army forces have uncovered hundreds of munitions caches and get intelligence tips from the local population every day.

Our biggest challenge with the Iraqi police is getting them fully equipped, paid, and consolidated in police stations. The support system that begins with the MOI [Ministry of the Interior], and extends through the provincial police chief, is still a work in progress. As a result, the Iraqi police still rely heavily on coalition logistics and support. We expect the equipment issue to improve soon, and we are working hard to get their logistics and command and control systems in place. One thing that is not lacking is the courage and the dedication of the Iraqi police in al Anbar. For them, this fight is personal. They know that al Qaeda is targeting them, their families and their tribes.

Some of our most recent successes have been in the areas of reconstruction and governance. The city government didn�t exist before April of this year, but has grown steadily over the past few months, and is now providing essential services to the population. In areas that were battlefields only a few months ago, city electrical employees are now repairing transformers and power lines. Sanitation workers are fixing sewer leaks caused by hundreds of buried IED�s [improvised explosive devices]. The Iraqis now have repaired the electrical grid in about 80 percent of the city and about 50 percent of the rubble has been removed. We expect to have all rubble removed in the next 90 � 120 days, which will allow for many parts of the city to start rebuilding.

We now have our Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (EPRT) and they are working hard to help build the municipal government in Ramadi. The EPRT is composed of personnel from the U.S. State Department, USAID, and other experts in various areas of government. We have partnered the EPRT with officials from the municipal government in much the same way that we partner Soldiers and Marines with Iraqi police. The EPRT works every day with the city government helping them with budgeting, planning, and delivering services to the public. The EPRT is a critical capability that we never had before, and I�m confident that it is going to make a big difference in building stability here in Ramadi.

We have been working closely with the chief judge of the province to rebuild the judicial system in Ramadi and throughout al Anbar province. Four months ago, there were no attorneys, judges, or investigators because of the threat from al Qaeda. Now that we have greatly increased security, these legal professionals are coming forward, and we are helping them reestablish the rule of law. Investigative judges are reviewing case files for prisoners in Iraqi jails. They have released many of these prisoners because of lack of evidence, but have also prepared over 100 files for prosecution. We established a detectives course in our police training center to help the Iraqi police do better investigations and evidence collection. We expect to have criminal courts beginning here in Ramadi in August�pretty good progress considering there was no rule of law here four months ago.

We are also making good progress on economic development by focusing on low-level economic stimulation. Once we had completed our large-scale offensive operations in February and March, we realized we needed to provide a massive and quick economic stimulus in order to stabilize the communities within the city. Because of the fighting in the city, the economy was in ruins, and it was clear that it would take some time to get businesses back in operation. We started day labor programs throughout the city to help clear trash and rubble, as well as provide an economic shot-in-the-arm to these devastated communities. These day-labor programs were all planned and executed by company commanders, and their effect was dramatic. We have funneled over $5 million in aid to these programs and have employed over 15,000 Iraqis. All this happened in about three months. This decentralized economic development program only used about 10 percent of my reconstruction funds, but has accounted for over 70 percent of new employment in Ramadi. These programs have cleaned neighborhoods, uncovered caches of munitions, and have restored hope and pride to the citizens of Ramadi.

We have joined efforts with organizations like the Iraqi/American Chamber of Commerce (IACC) to help revitalize small business in Ramadi. Company commanders went through every neighborhood and conducted assessments on all small businesses so we could help jump-start the small business grant program. We collected over 500 assessments, which helped the IACC begin its grant operations. This is the same technique we use with all non-military organizations�we use our presence in the city and access to the population to facilitate their operations. Revitalizing small businesses in Ramadi will lead to more stable communities, which helps us maintain overall security in the area.

We have a great relationship with another non-governmental organization called International Relief and Development (IRD). IRD focuses on programs for community stabilization just like we do, and it provides help in ways the military can�t. For example, IRD helped us fund a city-wide soccer league, providing equipment and uniforms to hundreds of young Iraqis. The organization has also helped us form women�s outreach groups that focus on adult literacy, health, and education issues. Forming relationships with NGOs like IRD is essential in a counterinsurgency campaign, and complements our efforts to improve security.

I�ve mentioned several times our focus on stabilizing communities, and I believe this is a fundamental aspect of a successful counterinsurgency campaign. Counterinsurgencies are fought neighborhood by neighborhood with the focus on protecting the population and improving conditions in the community. After clearing an area of terrorists (we do this by conducting large-scale offensive operations), our focus shifts to establishing a permanent security presence with coalition forces and ISF. That is the purpose of the Joint Security Station (JSS). The JSS helps secure and stabilize a community by proving an overt security presence, which establishes a perception of security in the minds of the population. Once they feel safe, they begin to provide intelligence to the police, and security improves steadily. This also helps insulate the community from terrorist attempts to move back into the neighborhood. We then shift our focus on non-lethal efforts to stabilize the community. This is done through day-labor programs, small business development, engagement with local sheikhs and Imams and information operations focused on the community.

Despite all the progress we have made with the Iraqis here in Ramadi, the area remains very dangerous. We recently received intelligence reports that terrorists were attempting to stage attacks from an area south of the city. We increased our offensive operations in that area and made contact with a large group of al Qaeda terrorists that were attempting to infiltrate into Ramadi. There were about 50 well-equipped and well-trained terrorists who were moving toward the city in two large trucks. They all had new equipment, weapons, and explosive belts. Their targets were the tribal leaders in Ramadi (we know this from propaganda videos taken off the terrorists). We attacked these terrorists using ground forces and attack helicopters, resulting in 40 enemy killed and three captured. If this force had made it into the city, it would have been a tremendous victory for al Qaeda. We successfully defeated their attack, but we know they will try again in the future. We continue to receive truck bomb attacks, but have been successful in keeping them out of the city and other populated areas. Al Qaeda has not given up on their desire to retake Ramadi and al Anbar, so we can�t let up in our efforts to stop them. The good news is that the people of al Anbar and Ramadi are united in their stand against al Qaeda.

Rock of the Marne!
John W. Charlton
COL, Infantry Commanding Camp
Ar Ramadi, Iraq

Trashhauler,

The work of Col. Charlton sounds wonderful. And this work has been performed by regimental, brigade and company commanders from beginning of the war until now. They have all worked to improve the area that they occupy in variety of very helpful ways: building social relationships with the communities and establishing political institutions and economic progress.

The problem is that there were never enough regimental, brigade and company commanders doing this work from beginning. It makes me so sad that after all work that these soldiers have done, 60% of Iraqis feel it is okay to kill Americans and 80% want us to leave. But they do!

We have seen the work of dedicated regimental commanders like Col. Charlton in a variety of different cities and regions, like Tal Afar, Fallujah, Nasariya and Basra. In each of those cities, the soldiers did great work securing the neighborhoods, eliminating offensive threats and helping to build up the community. And in each city, the troops had to leave to go to a more urgent area and those cities went down the shitter.

This is the problem with the new strategy. It is the same old strategy. I have been hearing "clear, build and hold" for three years now. The new JSS are interesting new tactic, but this tactic is not enough to correct a failed strategy. The problem is political, not military. Thus Col. Charlton could rebuild a thousand Ramadis and still not solve the problem, because we can't solve the problem. The problem is internal and we not an honest broker.

It's done son. It's only a question of how many people die now.

Noah

Thanks for such a succinct description of what is going on.

If the US had 350,000 troops in country, and 100,000 Arab speaking ones, and if the Iraqi National Army and Police Force were genuine, politically independent forces with a willingness to stand up and fight the insurgents

And the government and civil power was integrated with the local military power: if US colonels were the absolute authority in their districts, and the

This is what the British had in Malaysia and Kenya, more or less. And the Indians in the struggle with the Sikh separatists. And the US had in the Occupation of the Philippines.

It is what the Sinhalese have not had in the struggle with the Tamil Tigers.

Given all these things then the US might be on the way to winning this one in 5 or 10 years. That's what orthodox counterinsurgency theory says it will take.

When it was just fighting 20,000 disaffected Sunnis the US could stalemate them. But now it's a full scale multi-way civil war, with the Shia using the US force as cover to cement their power.

It's over, it's just a question of when do the helicopters fly over the Embassy Chancellery Compound in the Green Zone, and take out the last Americans, whilst throwing the last Vietnamese, I mean Iraqis, back into the crowd?

We recently received intelligence reports that terrorists were attempting to stage attacks from an area south of the city.....trashhauler at 2:12 AM

Also, it is well understood that the American military has financed a large and effect operation to publish misinformation, disinformation and outright propaganda. Can you guarantee that this individual is not part of it?

Every time someone comes up with happy talk from Iraq, you have to question their motive. Americans and Iraqis are being slaughtered daily. The infrastructure has deteriorated badly since the occupation. The living standards have become hellish. There are 2,000,000 Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries, more, far more, that before the invasion. There are almost 2,000,000 refugees within Iraq, people drive from their homes because of the chaos caused by the invasion and occupation.

Bush's invasion and occupation has taken a country that was functioning. Women had rights, citizens had security, people had jobs. The rule was: don't criticize goddam Saddam. Now, there is no law, there is no security, there is no safety, no water, no electricity, no sanitation. This occupation is a failure in every sense and no amount of happy talk will change that one iota.

9SEubT comment2 ,