Expecting the military to reform itself is kinda like expecting politicians to reform the political system... Didn't Max Weber have something to say on the subject of bureaucracies and their missions?

The best Colonels don't make General. This has been true for quite awhile now because to get promoted you need to conform.

Isn't this entire Iraq debacle such a stew of lies and deception that speculating as to why anything is (or isn't) done is rendered a worthless exercise?

The Green Machine in particular does NOT like rock stars.

Liberals did it.

Al, or egbert,or ex-liberal, or Marler, or someone, will be along shortly to explain precisely how liberals did it.

But liberals did it.

Requisite Disclaimers: I don't know McMaster, have never served with him, am exceedingly junior myself, and don't have all the facts.

That said - this blows. Like any bureaucracy, Big Army does some stupid shit sometimes. It should also be noted that LTC Yingling was McMaster's executive officer.

Tim: "The best Colonels don't make General."

Amen to that.

because all military promotions to the rank of brigadier general / rear admiral must be approved by the White House, COL McMaster has apparently refused to contort himself into a political pretzel for these clowns, and should thus wear this petty snub as a personal badge of honor.

Look at what Gen. Petreaus -- who authored the Army's current manual on counter-insurgency -- has had to do to curry favor, essentially agreeing with every crackpot White House political initiative on Iraq that runs directly counter to Petreaus' own standards of conducting counter-insurgency operations.

And as Kevin, et al., asked in an earlier thread a few days ago, whatever happened to Gen. Lute, our much ballyhooed "War Czar"?

May not be anything personal or particular; there's just so many slots open and so many proteges and followers who are "owed". They do say that all the generals are "picked" by the time they reach senior year at West Point.
Sometimes it's George Washington's army and sometimes it's James Wilkinson's--but Wilkinson had the longer term.

I see this a sign that the Army might be trying to distance itself from the disaster that Bush, Petreaus, and McMaster have brought on in Iraq.

Do we want the Army to focus on counterinsurgency? I don't want to fight an insurgency in the first place.

What reform did the Army need after 9/11? That sounds like Rumsfeld.

when you get down to it, the military is just another bureaucracy little different than any other arm of government.

Brojo, that sounded a lot more like Hostile; I have to now far prefered your new voice. But your characterization here is reductionist crap.

Do we want the Army to focus on counterinsurgency? I don't want to fight an insurgency in the first place.

We might not have a choice - many terrorist organizations (and not just the jihadist ones) see their "cause" as a insurgency against an oppressor.

For example, the administration's ignorance of Afghanistan may someday lead to us having to go back there and engage an insurgent Taliban. In that case, it would be nice if we had counterinsurgency experts leading the way.

Whether Brojo or Hostile, it's the same stupid, flaky, piss poor, not grounded in reality writing.

Hmm, www.smallwarsjounal.com is saying this was his first look for Brigadier General. If true, then this isn't nearly as big a deal. That needs to be pinned down.

I think it's pretty obvious...McMaster is not a Bushophile and therefore since he refuses to stuff his nose in dear leaders crack he doesn't get the star.
It's called the politization of the military.

Sheer, Donald,

Look, I get that there are alot of things not to like about the Bushies, but I think you're off base here. Sometimes, Big Army does what Big Army wants to do, and right now, most of the one and two star generals in the Army came up trained for High Intensity Combat, made their way as what amounts to middle management (in a environment that, until recently, increasingly devalued intellectualism) had limited combat experience, probably in Desert Storm, and in many cases have been poorly suited to transition to an Army that does anything but swing an ever larger, more powerful sledgehammer. These kinds of promotions fall into their hands, and such a system tends to go for the guys that don't make waves. In fact, if memory serves (and in this case, it may not) - promotion to Brigadier General requires the concurrence of every officer on the selection board.

For what it's worth - Bush has previously sung the praises of McMaster's work at Tal Afar. Remember, some things are true even if George Bush believes them. I think they'd love to promote him. An 0-6/0-7 isn't going to be politically troublesome, and it would reinforce the past message.

the military has any intention of supporting serious institutional change in response to 9/11

I see not the slightest reason for institutional change in the military in response to 9/11. I would, however, like to see the military undergo some significant institutional changes in response to the Iraq War.

They're not the same thing, you know . . .

IIRC, McMaster, then a captain, was also among the more noted officers of the previous Iraq war, for his role in the Battle of 73 Easting, and became something of a "rock star" from the attention given to that engagement.

The way the Bush administration does things, competence is a liability, not an asset. Competence leads the competent person to question things that don't make sense and to take correct, and corrective, actions, which means they would be butting heads with Bush flunkies day after day. Why would anyone be surprised that a competent person would not advance in that kind of atmosphere?

Al?

Egbert?

Ex-liberal?

[/crickets chirping]

When your military forces are structured to ignore brilliant tacticians/strategists in favor of non-offensive logistical competency (as all modern armies are) getting this kind of thing is not surprising.

Oh, come on! He gave money to a Democrat somewhere, sometime. You know that's it.

or when Rove's boys gave their PowerPoint on how the Army could "help us in 2006," he yawned.

The Bush Administration and the General Staff want to keep him on the reservation.

Thus they dangle his promotion in front of him yet another time to prevent him from straying and perhaps telling the truth about what's going on in Iraq and the dim prospects there for the future.

Should this particular general sound off about what he knows, church would be out, if you know what I mean.

I hope he gets in writing whatever it is he's being promised under the table for his continuing "fortitude."

One of the most famous tacticians of recent times was Col. James Boyd of the USAF, who came up with the OODA loop, energy management in air to air combat, heavily influenced USMC thought, and pissed off a lot of his USAF cohorts.

The pyramid to the top gets reeeaaallly narrow at the flag ranks, and you can guarantee good people don't make it. But it'd be nice to see a Gen McMaster.

Christ, someday the Army and the Air Force is going to wonder why the entire military was absorbed into the Navy Department (its on the way-- Admirals are already running most of the joint commands). Canning their best officers is a big part of it. Army Col. McMaster is one of the top military historians of the last 20 years and AF Col. Boyd was the preeminent military thinker of the last 50 years and both were denied their star.

In contrast the Navy and the Marines have actually reorganized themselves to plan, train and fight wars (and resupply the troops, the Achilles heel of Army airborne operations) in the post-Cold War era. The Marines in particular have made Boyd's theories the basis of their strategic doctrine.

Seeing as the Marines already have four (three active, one reserve) divisions, the manpower equivalent of 8 Army light infantry divisions, and the Navy already has combat aircraft and ballistic missiles-- there really is no reason to have an Army and Air Force. The Navy can take over the Air Force's equipment and personnel and the Marine Corps can likewise take over the Army's equipment and personnel to fill out new Marine divisions.

Just weeks after the end of World War II in 1945, Congress debated whether to keep the War and Navy Departments separate or to combine them (in the end, the compromise bill kept them separate and added a Defense Department over the Army, Navy and new Air Force Departments). General Eisenhower testified and:
"made a 'flash guess' that a military establishment under a single command could be maintained with 25% fewer men than under divided command. 'With integration we can buy more security for less money'."
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,776402,00.html

I think Ike's math still holds, kick the Army and Air Force to the curb and run everything through the Navy Department. We'd be just as safe (hell, probably safer) and we could spend substantially less than our curent half a trillion a year defense budget.

I am not a historian and I have been out of the Army (retired) for 14 years, but if memory serves me right, Eisenhower was a Colonel on December 7, 1941. Thank goodness Marshall was insightful enough to know that �those who can� don�t always make it and Eisenhower had 4 stars in short order. Many of the people in leadership positions and command at the beginning of WWII were reassigned, relieved, send stateside, etc. because of poor performance when combat began. Col McMaster seems to fit this mold. If Petreaus can pull this thing off in Iraq for sure he is the next Chief of Staff or Chairman of the JCS. Maybe then he can reward McMaster then.

I hope you guys on active duty can get a handle on this war. I have 2 sons headed that way. The oldest is headed to the 4th Bde of the 101st in Oct after the FAOBC.

The Navy can take over the Air Force's equipment and personnel and the Marine Corps can likewise take over the Army's equipment and personnel to fill out new Marine divisions.

If you were to do something like that, it probably be best to give the Marines the Air Force missions (and associated hardware and personnel) related to tactical reconnaissance and close support; while the Navy gets the the strategic and logistics missions and personnel. Essentially, the Marines get the land combat mission and the immediate tactical support for it in the air, etc., and the Navy gets a broad mission of providing superiority and support on a more strategic level.

In addition to cost savings, you probably minimize the boundary disputes and interservice friction over missions that have typically been cited as problematic in how things like close air support end up getting done, as the Air Force is perceived as not really wanting the mission, but at the same time wanting to preserve its exclusivity (vs. the Army) on fixed-wing manned combat aircraft.

Terry Whittington

My thoughts and prayers go with your sons.

Please don't misunderstand me, and understand that this is a British perspective. By way of background, my brother is named for a cousin of my father who died in leading American Rangers ashore in WWII (he was a British Commando (special forces) officer-- the unit's mission was to seize a harbour, and it was wiped out to the man. They named a local pub after him, in my father's village.

What I would say is that Iraq is the worst political, strategic and military disaster that the US and Great Britain have entered into since WWII. Well we had Suez in 1956, which Pres. Eisenhower nixed-- he was outraged at our conniving with the Israelis and the French. Suez was monumentally stupid.

But really, as a joint operation, we've never done anything stupider together. You had Vietnam, but I think Iraq is fast catching up on Vietnam as the strategic disaster of a generation, with potentially worse long term results.

My best thoughts for your sons, and my dearest hopes that our political leaders come to their senses and craft an exit strategy.

Sincerely

J.

If this is McMaster's second bite at the apple, then he will probably resign soon because he ain't going any higher.

As for John Boyd, he was had a famous speech that he gave to junior officers: "You have to decide whether you want to be something or do something." The meaning was decide whether you want to be a general or do something of significance. In the Pentagon, it is exceedingly difficult to accomplish both.

J.-- thanks for your thoughts about my sons. Regarding the "strategic disaster of a generation", I have deep concerns/resentment over the manner in which we won the war but were losing the peace.

Let me ask a couple of questions about your concerns: (1) Are British concerns the same as European concerns? To me, it seems that �old Europe� was content to let Arab/Muslim Terrorist kill at will (Munich, Rome and Vienna Airports) and do absolutely nothing except talk about it. At least Bush took a stand somewhere�he could have looked to Iran and killing terrorist in Iraq is a s good as killing terrorist in Iran, Syria, Egypt, etc.. (2) What do you feel should have been done? Not gone there at all or used a different �peacekeeping� mythology after winning the initial fight.

1. re Britain and Europe

We like to pretend we are different, we are not. We have the same issues with energy supply, and with muslim minorities.

The British concern for a 'special relationship' with the US is largely a British predilection to overestimate ourselves as a world power. The US does what the US finds in its best interests, and we can but tag along.

re Old Europe and counter terror

The terrorists at Munich, Rome and Vienna Airports were all hunted down. Carlos the Jackal went to the slammer. The various Palestinian groups were, one way or another, extinguished.

Europeans also understand that Palestinian terrorism was fundamentally different from the Islamic terrorism we are now confronted with. The Palestinians are fighting for a home. The Islamicists are fighting to destroy the conservative and socialist Arab states of the Middle East, and replace them with Islamic ones. In fact, most Islamicists are quite peaceful-- see the newly re-elected government of Turkey. But there are some real extremists, particularly in Saudi Arabia (Osama bin Ladin), Egypt and the other more repressive Middle Eastern Countries.

Iran is of course another kettle of fish entirely. A different stripe of Islam, a different set of strategic objectives. And a 2,500 year old country and civilisation. The Romans toughest enemy was the Persians, and so was the Byzantine's-- not much has changed in 2,500 years.

The French Surete in particular is deviously effective on counter-terrorism. They work very closely with the Algerians and the Syrians, who are the toughest secret services in the Middle East (other than the Iranians and the Israelis) and have the most experience crushing Islamic terror. When France was victimised by Islamic terrorists in the early 90s, they were far more effective than the British or Americans in hunting them down. In fact, their chief of counterterrorism comes to London and gives lectures to British and American terror chiefs.

We have in fact run the Lockerbie killers to ground, although it's very likely we have the wrong guy.

Bush didn't take a stand. What he did was use the excuse of 9-11 to do something he had already wanted to do, which was invade Iraq and depose Saddam Hussein. They associated the two in the minds of the public, but actually there was never a connection.

Saddam Hussein never had anything to do with Islamic attacks against the West. In fact, no one was hated more by bin Ladin than Saddam Hussein (other than the Saudi Royal Family).

The shocking thing about the 'War on Terror' is how little actual pursuing the real terrorists has been done. And how much has been done to make their cause of recruitment easier.

2. I don't think we should have invaded Iraq at all. We had no good case what we wanted Iraq to be after our invasion, and going back to 1917 and our last invasion, we knew the country would be impossible to govern.

Having invaded, not to make proper preparations to control and stabilise the country, turned what was a very bad decision, into a strategic disaster.

I know one of the senior guys on the British side. The plan was to go in quickly, do whatever the Americans did in their plan, and get out quickly. It hadn't occurred to anyone that the all-powerful Americans didn't have a plan.

A side effect of invading Iraq is that key intelligence and special forces resources were diverted from Afghanistan. Having lost Iraq, we are now busily losing Afghanistan.

J. Thanks for your response. What are your thoughts on Iran? Misunderstood nice guys trying to get the Great Satan out of the area? or, behind most of the terrorism in the mid east? And, what do we ignorant colonials do about them, if anything?