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Read the story and see the video discussion by the authors about why creeping consolidation is crushing American livelihoods.
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Crises can force even the most dysfunctional governments to changeand Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou aims to prove it.
By Bruce Clark
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April 27, 2008
THE RATING AGENCIES....In the New York Times magazine today, Roger Lowenstein takes a look at the role of rating agencies in our current credit crisis. Were they at fault because they got in bed with their customers and overrated complex new mortgage-backed securities? Or were they innocent bystanders in a world gone mad?
Proposition A gets an airing early on. Lowenstein explains that after the sudden collapse of Penn Central in 1970, new rules were put in place that effectively barred large classes of investors from buying anything other than investment grade bonds. And it was the rating agencies that decided which bonds were investment grade and which ones weren't: Issuers thus were forced to seek credit ratings (or else their bonds would not be marketable). The agencies — realizing they had a hot product and, what's more, a captive market — started charging the very organizations whose bonds they were rating. This was an efficient way to do business, but it put the agencies in a conflicted position.
....The evidence on whether rating agencies bend to the bankers' will is mixed. The agencies do not deny that a conflict exists, but they assert that they are keen to the dangers and minimize them....But in structured finance, the agencies face pressures that did not exist when John Moody was rating railroads. On the traditional side of the business, Moody's has thousands of clients (virtually every corporation and municipality that sells bonds). No one of them has much clout. But in structured finance, a handful of banks return again and again, paying much bigger fees. A [big deal] can bring Moody's $200,000 and more for complicated deals. And the banks pay only if Moody's delivers the desired rating. Tom McGuire, the Jesuit theologian who ran Moody's through the mid-'90s, says this arrangement is unhealthy. If Moody's and a client bank don't see eye to eye, the bank can either tweak the numbers or try its luck with a competitor like S.&P., a process known as "ratings shopping."
And it seems to have helped the banks get better ratings. [Joseph] Mason, of Drexel University, compared default rates for corporate bonds rated Baa with those of similarly rated collateralized debt obligations until 2005 (before the bubble burst). Mason found that the C.D.O.'s defaulted eight times as often. One interpretation of the data is that Moody's was far less discerning when the client was a Wall Street securitizer.
....Nothing sent the agencies into high gear as much as the development of structured finance....Credit markets are not continuous; a bond that qualifies, though only by a hair, as investment grade is worth a lot more than one that just fails....The challenge to investment banks is to design securities that just meet the rating agencies' tests...."Every agency has a model available to bankers that allows them to run the numbers until they get something they like and send it in for a rating," a former Moody's expert in securitization says. In other words, banks were gaming the system; according to Chris Flanagan, the subprime analyst at JPMorgan, "Gaming is the whole thing."
Even a small tweak in a rating can make a big difference, and both the rating agencies and the banks issuring the bonds have an incentive to tweak things in the bank's favor: the bank because it makes their offerings more profitable, the agency because it makes their client happy. Whether or not the agencies are "keen to the dangers" of this, it's naive to think that it doesn't happen. It's a lot like the "Chinese wall" that was supposed to separate the supposedly independent research analysts from the investment bankers at financial services firms during the dotcom boom. Guess what? It turned out the wall was made of rice paper.
But then there's Proposition B. It suggests that the rating agencies used historical models to analyze mortgage-backed securities, and in the brave new world of subprime hegemony and structured finance, their old models broke down: Poring over the data, Moody's discovered that the size of people's first mortgages was no longer a good predictor of whether they would default; rather, it was the size of their first and second loans — that is, their total debt — combined. This was rather intuitive; Moody's simply hadn't reckoned on it. Similarly, credit scores, long a mainstay of its analyses, had not proved to be a "strong predictor" of defaults this time. Translation: even people with good credit scores were defaulting.
Roughly speaking, Brad DeLong opts for Proposition B. He thinks the problem is that too many fund managers simply accepted ratings as a gold standard instead of doing their jobs and asking the "three standard questions" that all investors should always ask. "If you truly do not want to ask the three standard questions and evaluate credit risk you should be in U.S. Treasuries (and even there you have to assess inflation risk and, unless you are planning to hold to maturity, monetary policy risk). And if you want higher yields than Treasuries offer — well, then you are back to asking your three standard questions again."
Point taken. But I wonder if this is realistic. There are a very limited number of extremely smart people in Wall Street firms creating all these complex new financial instruments, and they're very highly motivated to make them as impenetrable as possible. The average pension fund manager or county treasurer is simply never going to be able to analyze them in any serious kind of way. It's easy to say they should, but that's like saying that our schools would be better off if every schoolteacher had a PhD. Given the current state of the art in human nature, it's just not going to happen.
So in reality, there's a large class of investors who have little choice but to trust the rating agencies. And if rating agencies have a fundamental financial interest in colluding with their clients, then that collusion is almost certain to happen. It's true that the agencies might also make innocent mistakes, but let's face it: the incentives work strongly in the direction of making all those mistakes in favor of their banking clients, not the investor community. It's possible, for example, that Moody's genuinely didn't realize that first and second loans combined were a better measure of debt stress than first mortgages alone, but that's really not rocket science. It's hard not to think that they weren't trying very hard to understand the emerging new realities. As Upton Sinclair famously said, "It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding it."
So sign me up as a dissenter. Yes, investors are responsible for analyzing the risk of their investments. At the same time, when it comes to the kinds of investment vehicles routinely created today, the only realistic option a lot of investors have is to trust the advice of independent experts — ones who have their own staff of rocket scientists and access to all the underlying data that makes up a modern investment vehicle. If it turns out that those independent experts have enormous incentives to help the bankers game the system, that's a problem. And right now we're all paying a pretty big price for it.
—Kevin Drum 2:39 PM
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Yes, investors are responsible for analyzing the risk of their investments. At the same time, when it comes to the kinds of investment vehicles routinely created today, the only realistic option a lot of investors have is to trust the advice of independent experts — ones who have their own staff of rocket scientists and access to all the underlying data that makes up a modern investment vehicle.
I'd say it depends a lot on who the investors are. For instance, the officials in charge of investing public funds, IMHO, have an affirmative obligation to understand the investment vehicles well enough to make their own assessment of the risk, rather than trusting someone else.
If that means they're stuck with putting their money in bonds or index funds rather than sophisticated investment vehicles with a higher return, that's where they should be stuck. As Warren Buffett has pointed out in the past, the first rule of investing is to not lose your principal.
Even if you're a private investor with the right to gamble your stake in whatever manner you choose, it's a dumb idea to put your money in a high-yield investment with a significant chance of losing a good deal of your initial investment, or into such an investment where you just plain can't understand what the risks even are.
But when you're acting in a fiduciary manner with the public's money or with a pension fund, doing so is not only dumb, it's wrong.
Posted by: low-tech cyclist on April 27, 2008 at 3:02 PM | PERMALINK
In other words, don't trust the rating agencies.
Which might be good advice. Perhaps the last few years have been a rating agency bubble, and now it's popped?
Posted by: Kevin Drum on April 27, 2008 at 3:11 PM | PERMALINK
> I'd say it depends a lot on who the investors
> are. For instance, the officials in charge of
> investing public funds, IMHO, have an affirmative
> obligation to understand the investment vehicles
> well enough to make their own assessment of the
> risk, rather than trusting someone else.
Of course in the midwest even a State government is limited to paying its investment guys/gals $75,000/year while the rating agencies will hire those same kids out of the State office for $150,000 after 2 years experience. Creates a bit of a problem, eh? Can you say "capture"?
Cranky
Posted by: Cranky Observer on April 27, 2008 at 3:20 PM | PERMALINK
"And the banks pay only if Moody's delivers the desired rating."
Well there you have it.
Posted by: jimbo on April 27, 2008 at 3:24 PM | PERMALINK
This is actually nothing new. The Washington Post did a story years ago about the rating agencies' conflicts of interest. Sovereign ratings are also subject to the whims of which agency a country decides to do does business with.
Posted by: botecelli on April 27, 2008 at 3:34 PM | PERMALINK
Kevin - I don't think anyone should blindly trust the rating agencies, to the point of "I have no frickin' idea what's going on here, but Moody's gave it an Aaa rating, so it must be OK."
If you understand the game, using Moody's to help you decide which players to invest your money with is one thing. But if you don't understand the game, you're better off not playing. I really don't see a situation in life where this is a bad rule.
Posted by: low-tech cyclist on April 27, 2008 at 3:51 PM | PERMALINK
Don't trust the ratings agencies? Geeeee - but it was those good Wall Street folks that told me to buy ENRON!
And look at all the money we all made on that.
Posted by: on April 27, 2008 at 3:56 PM | PERMALINK
"If it turns out that those independent experts have enormous incentives to help the bankers game the system, that's a problem"
In other words, they're not independent.
Posted by: another steve on April 27, 2008 at 4:21 PM | PERMALINK
Perhaps the last few years have been a rating agency bubble...
As Mason put it in his Sep 2007 testimony: The regulatory use of ratings thus has changed the constituency demanding a rating from free-market investors interested in a conservative opinion to regulated investors looking for an inflated one.
Posted by: has407 on April 27, 2008 at 4:30 PM | PERMALINK
Same thing I said over on DeLong's site: it simply isn't possible to run a modern economy if /everyone/ is expected to be an expert in /every/ aspect of every transaction they undertake to the point of being able to outthink and see through every instance of sharp dealing and fraud. Similarly if they have to double-audit every action of the supposedly independent auditors that have been socially (and in many cases legally) blessed as disinterested neutral parties. If it is true that that is actually the situation and there is nothing to be done about it, then it is time for some very heavy-handed Federal regulation and some serious restrictions on the salaries paid in that industry.
Cranky
Posted by: Cranky Observer on April 27, 2008 at 4:31 PM | PERMALINK
" the only realistic option a lot of investors have is to trust the advice of independent experts "
Let's see. The independent experts say something about entitlements, and I believe them and order up a significant restructuring of entitlements. Things blow up on me.
How can I go back to the monopoly expert and get my trillion dollars back?
This is Kevin Drum and his version of God. God is someone who looks experty, and therefore God should be trusted. If the experty type person screws up, then God junior, the government, will fix things.
Posted by: Matt on April 27, 2008 at 4:39 PM | PERMALINK
*
Posted by: mhr on April 27, 2008 at 4:52 PM | PERMALINK
mhr - during the Clinton years we had Whitewater, Travelgate, the Clintons' supposed murder of Vince Foster, not to mention the Lewinsky scandal/impeachment.
Mind you, President Clinton's team had some real crises to deal with too, such as the international banking crisis of 1998 that everyone forgets because...because they had good people who knew what they were doing, and kept things from going haywire.
When actual crises crop up these days, there's just a bunch of crony capitalists and free-market ideologues in the front office, debating with each other over whether to help just the big shots, or to help nobody at all. Usually the first group wins.
Posted by: low-tech cyclist on April 27, 2008 at 5:11 PM | PERMALINK
Keep in mind also that it's not just a question of the borrowers and lenders by themselves, but the leveraging of financial instruments through those loans and their subsequent effect on almost everyone, not just the principals. IOW, it isn't like someone buying rotten food that hurts only themselves.
Posted by: Neil B. on April 27, 2008 at 5:43 PM | PERMALINK
One of the first rules of investing, for anybody at any level, is never to invest in anything which you do not understand.
Does that greatly limit the number of potential investment vehicles for most people? Yes, of course it does. Is this necessarily a bad thing? NO!
There are thousands of investment vehicles out there (individual stocks, mutual funds, index funds, ETF's, bonds, CD's, etc.) which deliver perfectly acceptable, if not downright excellent, returns with relatively low risk. After all, the risk attached to TIPS, bonds guaranteed to outperform the rate of inflation (thus guaranteeing you a positive net return), is nil.
It's only when people get greedy and seek unreasonably high returns (without regard to the fact that this will necessitate accepting higher risk) as well that the creation of impenetrably complex financial instruments even takes place.
In this case, you had large financial corporations and hedge funds who make a large portion of their trading profits by using borrowed money (leverage) to trade illiquid financial instruments with tiny profit margins (often less than a penny on the dollar) at very high volumes get snared by their own ignorance of the basic concept of risk versus reward.
They were blinded by their own greed, plain and simple...
Posted by: mfw13 on April 27, 2008 at 8:24 PM | PERMALINK
Everyone is looking for that which does not exist-the independent expert to tell you what to do with your money. The real problem is that too many people think this mythical being really does exist.
If you don't understand what you are investing in, then don't do it.
Posted by: Yancey Ward on April 27, 2008 at 8:42 PM | PERMALINK
Another fucking Mickey Kaus post from "call me a dissenter" Kevin.
Why can't you link to Brad Friedman from the Brad Blog instead of Brad Freaking DeLong, too, Kevin, if you need to quote a Brad?
Or quote one of your effing cats?
You're becoming more neo-Kausian all the time.
Posted by: SocraticGadfly on April 27, 2008 at 9:42 PM | PERMALINK
Beyond that, Kevin, it's hard to tell which side you finally come down on here.
This is like a Dallas Morning News editorial: "On the one hand, on the other hand."
Or, as I extend that, "Shit on the one hand, the Dallas Morning News on the other."
Take a stand on something, and do so in clear, nonconvoluted English.
Posted by: SocraticGadfly on April 27, 2008 at 9:51 PM | PERMALINK
I disagree with Kevin Drum here (and mostly agree with Brad DeLong, which doesn't happen that often). There haven't been big losses incurred in CDOs by unsophisticated investors who were relying on the rating agencies: the big losses have been incurred by big banks that were holding lots of improperly hedged inventory and by hedge funds that made speculative bets that went wrong. CDOs aren't sold in $5000 increments to widows and orphans, you know. So it just isn't true that CDO purchasers have no choice but to rely on the rating agencies.
True, there have been a few counties or other local governments that lost some money, and possibly the affected states should implement stronger guidelines for investment of local government money. I can assure you that counties in New York State aren't permitted to invest in anything that has been affected by the credit crisis.
Posted by: y81 on April 27, 2008 at 10:02 PM | PERMALINK
y81 has it right. Moreover, those large investors had access to resources that strongly suggested they were at far greater risk from CDO/subprime investments than the standard ratings indicated. That they did not avail themselves of those resources, or chose to ignore them, should be a strong clue as to what is wrong with this picture.
Posted by: has407 on April 27, 2008 at 10:56 PM | PERMALINK
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