*

In response to Kevin's post:

Well, that's fine, but it does nothing to take away the concern that the top American commander in Aghanistan's saying that we need four times as many troops in that country as we've got now conjures up.

It's no surprising that the Taliban melted away rather than stand toe to toe with NATO forces. Although NATO, the US and the Afghan army have far fewer than the estimated 400,000 troops necessary to control the country, they DO have more than enough forces to deny control to the Taliban.

Essentially, neither side has anywhere near enough force to achieve victory. The field of decision, as with most insurgencies, is political NOT military. Focusing on the military dimension, while leveraging one tactical advantage, sets us at a distinct strategic disadvantage.

The same can be said for the Republican characterization of the GWoT (or whatever they're calling it these days) as primarily a military struggle. Though there is a military dimension, this is, in essence, a low intensity conflict on a grand strategic scale. Like any insurgency, this struggle is primarily political and is better prosecuted through political and law enforcement efforts than through military means. Our reliance on almost exclusively military solutions explains why we are losing the contest so completely.

Two words:

Homefield advantage.

Wow - the Taliban are getting good at media manipulation - I wonder who they learnt that from.

Has anyone ever shown Battle of Algiers to the people in command of these forces? I mean, the stuff the Taliban is doing has been done for decades - it's not new at all. Ditto with the Iraqi insurgency. Yet the commanders of NATO and the US are as flummoxed as the French were in Africa.

1-202-225-0100, I called today, now its YOUR turn.

Land mines? That's not going to go over well with the civilians.

GOD FUCKING DAMN YOU GEORGE BUSH! If we had just stayed in Afghanistan it would be a lot closer to a fucking jewel right now and PAKISTAN that happy supply of nukes to all and sundry, would be trapped between it an India.

As I recall, the landmines were being seeded with mines just in time for crops to be harvested.

The point of the insurgents is not to win the hearts and minds of the population, but to keep the population dissatisfied with the government. The population will never actively support the Taliban (they have too much first hand experience for that!), but in exchange for their loyalty and support, at a minimum, people expect their government to be able to protect them from indiscriminate violence. By terrorizing the population with near impunity, the Taliban are essentially forcing the people to withdraw their allegiance from a demonstrably impotent government and concentrate on self-preservation. As long as the people are unwilling to act in their collective best interests, neither society nor government can function.

The only options open to a government waging a counter-insurgency are:

A) To lower the risk associated with participating in nation-building by protecting them more effectively from attack while demonstrating the community benefits that outweigh individual risks of collaboration, or,

B) To make the people more frightened of the government than they are of the insurgents.

(The first option is obviously the only real option, though sadly there is no dearth of governments that have chosen the latter - too often with American support.)

"GOD FUCKING DAMN YOU GEORGE BUSH! If we had just stayed in Afghanistan it would be a lot closer to a fucking jewel right now"
_____________________

Now there's some wishful thinking, borne out of ignorance of what we are facing in terms of terrain, lack of infrastructure, and tepid support for the fight on the part of our allies.

We can, perhaps, make the official government and the cities secure. We cannot conquer the Hindu Kush, nor crush the Pashtuns. Any final settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban is going to involve a considerable amount of compromise - presumably without al Qaeda. No doubt many will call it failure, because it does not fit their conceptions about how a war is supposed to end.

No matter how long you polish this turd, it ain't gonna turn into a jewel.

trashhauler,
If you lay off the strong stuff you might be able to recognize sarcasm.

Oh, was that what it was? Hard to tell here, you gotta admit.

When MNPundit at 1:06 said: "GOD FUCKING DAMN YOU GEORGE BUSH! If we had just stayed in Afghanistan it would be a lot closer to a fucking jewel right now"

If that's not sarcasm I will eat my keyboard.
(Not the bronze one, but still...)

NOT equating the cause, but they are like the AMericans and the British. The Americans did not fight fair, no rows of soldiers, but hiding out and ambush.

duh

In the movie Charlie Wilson's War the portrayal of Soviet helicopter gunships killing Afhanis was pretty graphic. The US is doing to Afghanis today what the Soviets did yesterday.

Kevin's remark about the Taliban 'fading away' made me wonder if there is an Islamic theory of guerilla war. All the books I know that give instructions on how to conduct an insurgency go back to the ColdWar and were written by communists (Mao, Ho). Presumably these would be questionable for Islamists because no plans for developing Sharia or developing a Muslim 'brand' and etc.

I ask because Islamists have been really bad insurgents. They kill too many of the population that they depend on to protect them. The 'Al Qaida in Iraq' bunch seems to have quickly been rolled up after they wrapped 'mentally challenged' women in explosive belts and used them as bombs. The 'Awakening' wouldn't have happened unless the Jihadists had lost the public relations war. I doubt a successful insurgency would mine farmers' fields.

Two words:

Homefield advantage.

Posted by: Blue Girl, Red State

Been there, done that.
It's a total waste of blood and treasure to try and occupy territory when the locals don't want you there.
Winning a war is one thing, occupation is totally different.

AQI isn't/wasn't a true insurgency. True, they employed insurgent tactics, but the fact that they are/were primarily foreign fighters pursuing a militant Sunni Islamic agenda in a majority Shiite country left them vulnerable as no home grown insurgents would.

Even among the Sunni community, they weren't able to draw very deep support. The Iraqi Sunni community is more secular Ba'athist than militant Islamist and objected to AQI's imposition of Sharia and murder of tribal leaders who failed to toe the line.