June/July/August 2014 Beyond Identity Politics

To reach the white working class, promise an economy that “works for everyone.”

By Ruy Teixeira and John Halpin

Credit: CBS via Getty Images

In the last three presidential elections, the Democratic candidate lost among white working-class (non-college-educated) voters by an average of 22 points. The worst performance came in 2012, when Obama lost this group— once the bulwark of the Democratic coalition—by a staggering 26 points (62 to 36 percent).

The loss of this key demographic is mitigated to some degree by its shrinking size. The numbers of white working-class voters will probably dip to just 30 percent of all voters by 2020 and 44 percent of white voters. This is a dramatic decline from 1988, when white working-class voters were 54 percent of all voters and almost two-thirds (64 percent) of white voters.

Some observers argue that since the ranks of the white working class are declining, Democrats should simply rely instead on their rising “Obama coalition” of minorities, unmarried and working women, seculars, Millennials, and educated whites living in more urbanized states. Yet it would be a grave mistake for Democrats to count on this strategy.

For one, the Democrats’ deficit with working-class whites was the key reason for the GOP landslide in 2010, and could hand the Republicans another big win in the upcoming midterm elections. Despite their declining numbers, white working-class voters will be an ever-present threat to progressives in elections and to progressive governance as long as so many remain so hostile to the party.

The Democrats don’t need a majority of white working-class voters to come over to their side. But they do need to deny the Republican Party the supermajorities of white working-class voters that Republicans successfully mobilize today. Moreover, broadening the Democratic appeal to white working-class voters should greatly reduce the threat posed to the party when other constituencies, such as Latinos or younger voters, exhibit only modest turnout—particularly a problem during off-year elections—or waiver in their support for Democrats. Furthermore—and this is critical—by depriving the GOP of its uncontested supermajorities among white working-class voters, Democrats would finally force today’s intransigent Republican Party toward the center. It is only those supermajorities that allow Republicans to thumb their noses at the rising Obama coalition and dig in their heels at the smallest progressive change.

Take that advantage away, and the electoral arithmetic becomes so dire for Republicans that their strategy will have to change simply to remain competitive. True, a more moderate and reasonable GOP would attract more voters who now vote Democratic, but overall it would be a plus for progressive governance by improving the climate for legislation that actually addresses social problems.

Is there reasonable hope that such a coalition can be formed? We believe there is. Start with the evolution of the white working class itself. Over time, we expect that generational change will make the white working class more liberal and open to progressive agendas. This will occur as white working-class Millennials gradually take the place of generally more conservative white working-class Baby Boomers and older Americans. Democrats generally receive greater support among Millennial white working-class voters than among older white working-class voters. This gap peaked in 2008 when Obama’s margin was 30 points better among eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-old white working-class Millennial voters than among their older counterparts.

This generation gap is partially explained by the fact that white working-class Millennials are substantially more liberal on social issues. For example, in the 2012 National Election Study, 54 percent of white working-class Millennials thought that gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to legally marry, compared to just 34 percent of older white working-class voters. They are also more likely than older working-class Americans to be secular in orientation, another indicator of liberalism. In the 2012 Democracy Corps post-election survey, 33 percent of white working-class Millennials reported no religious affiliation, compared to 14 percent of their older counterparts.

And perhaps most important, today’s young white working-class voters are notably more liberal on issues concerning the role of government, which have been an especially strong factor in moving the white working class to the right over time. (Most academic analyses agree that these issues were far more important in causing white working-class defection from the Democrats than were social/cultural issues.)

An example of how large a generation gap exists within the white working class on the role of government comes from a 2010 Hart Research/CAP survey. It found that 61 percent of Millennial non-college-educated whites favored a strong government to deal with today’s complex economic problems, compared to just 38 percent of older working-class whites. White working-class Millennials are also very close to white college-educated Millennials in their views on this issue, in contrast to older white working-class individuals, who are more conservative than older white college-educated cohorts.

One might fear a growing, reactionary backlash among the white working class, young and old, as they find themselves contending with an increasingly diverse society. This is possible, but data from a 2013 CAP/PolicyLink/Latino Decisions poll suggests that the white working class is far less resistant to diversity than is generally supposed. The poll asked, for example, whether “Americans will learn more from one another and be enriched by exposure to many different cultures.” Almost two-thirds (64 percent) of the white working class agreed. The same number agreed that “[a] bigger, more diverse workforce will lead to more economic growth.” Similarly, 62 percent agreed that “diverse workplaces and schools will help make American businesses more innovative and competitive,” while 58 percent agreed that “people will become more accepting of their differences and more willing to find common ground.” Fifty-seven percent agreed that “with more diverse people working and living together, discrimination will decrease.” Finally, 52 percent agreed that “the entry of new people into the American workforce will increase our tax base and help support our retiree population.”

Further, as we would expect, white working-class Millennials are significantly more open to rising diversity than the white working class as a whole, so generational replacement will simply enhance these positive sentiments. For example, 75 percent of white working-class Millennials think Americans will be enriched by exposure to many cultures, and 73 percent believe a bigger, more diverse workforce will lead to more economic growth.

All this suggests that the white working class is likely to change over time in ways that should make it more receptive to progressive appeals. But which appeals? It is not enough to gain a somewhat more receptive audience; the sale must still be made. What, if anything, do progressives have in their portfolio that might particularly appeal to the white working class, while also appealing to the base groups of their rising coalition.

Ruy Teixeira and John Halpin are senior fellows at the Center for American Progress. Teixeira is the author of the Emerging Democratic Majority. Halpin’s work focuses on political ideology, elections, and public opinion.


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